Stop-and-frisk: does it work?
the bratton years
While stop-and-frisk has been legal since the Supreme Court ruling in the 1968 Terry v. Ohio case, it was not widely used until William Bratton was appointed Commissioner of the New York City Police Department by Mayor Rudy Giuliani. Bratton was a follower of the Broken Windows theory, first introduced by James Wilson and George Kelling in 1982; the theory argues that failing to prevent lower-level crimes, such as panhandling and public drinking, makes an environment give the impression of being unlawful, thereby encouraging more serious crimes to occur. Bratton thus imposed a much more aggressive approach to low-level crimes in the hopes that it would translate to a reduction in New York City's more serious crimes. To accomplish this, Bratton introduced CompStat: a system that called for weekly crime reports, accountability, and criticisms of the commanders of each precinct. Commanders were now directly responsible for the crime occurring in their precinct and were regularly "grilled" on how they would reduce the crime rate in their precinct. This system of accountability was flawed, however, in that it now forced commanders to produce lower crime numbers than the previous month, by any means necessary. These fears were later exposed by John Eterno, a retired NYPD captain and criminal justice professor, and Eli Silverman, a professor of criminal justice, in a report that analyzed the exact methods used by the CompStat in 2010. Dozens of retired police officials in this report claimed that the pressure coming from the department's administration prompted them to downgrade serious offenses to less serious ones, with the intent of conveying a lower overall crime rate for New York City; for example, there were over 2,000 grand larcenies that could have been added to the 2009 yearly totals that were instead classified as lesser crimes, such as lost property and petty larceny [1]. While the report certainly produced outrage over the system employed by the NYPD for the past 20 years, then-Commissioner Ray Kelly's acknowledgement of the system's flaws seemed to do little to ease criticisms of the department.
Regardless of the program's criticisms however, crime in New York City, as well as around the country, declined significantly. Commissioner Bratton and Mayor Giuliani thus pointed to these figures as proof that the administration's policies had produced tangible results. This decline in crime was not without its critics, however, with University of Chicago economist Steven Levitt being one of the administration's harshest critics. The Freakonomics author's 2004 report analyzed crime rates across the country and argued that more aggressive policing, increased gun control laws, and increased use of capital punishment were not chief reasons for the decline in crime in the 1990s; instead, he argues that number of police officers, an increasing prison population, and, controversially, the legalization of abortion are the factors that played a critical role in the reduction of crime in the 1990s [2]. Additionally, Levitt's analysis shows that cities like San Diego, which did not implement a similar program, saw an almost identical decline in crime, further giving credibility to the argument that CompStat was not solely responsible for the city's crime reduction. Another critical report of CompStat comes from 2005 report by Richard Rosenfeld, Robert Fornango, and Eric Baumer of the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Their report's goal was to prove that the decrease in crime in New York cannot wholly be credited to CompStat, but instead to the reduction in crime across the United States. They focus on three key policies: New York's CompStat, Boston's Ceasefire, and Richmond's Exile and compare their trends to that of the entire country, whilst controlling for other variables. Their findings show that New York City's crime rate, when other relevant variables are controlled, follows the trajectory of the rest of the nation [3]. These reports are only few of the many criticisms that have been aimed at CompStat and similar policies of the 1990s. However, it is important to note that CompStat and policies like it are not the entire picture; Los Angeles, while lacking a system like CompStat, is well known for aggressive policing, which ultimately culminated in 1992 riots in response to the acquittal of the police officers involved in the arrest and beating of Rodney King. Thus, it is important to realize that while New York City saw an increase in aggressive policing strategies, it was not alone in this regard.
A New Era
It is important to note that while aggressive policing and the implementation of CompStat originated in the 1990s under Commissioner Bratton and Mayor Giuliani, it was not until Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed Raymond Kelly as Commissioner of the NYPD that stop-and-frisk came into full effect. Due to their perception that the policies of Bratton and Giuliani had been successful in significantly reducing the crime rate of New York City, Bloomberg and Kelly saw no reason to not continue the legacy of their predecessors. Under Kelly, stop-and-frisk rose to heights that Bratton could have only ever imagined.
As the statistic above shows, stop-and-frisk exponentially grew under the Bloomberg administration, peaking in 2011 with 685,724 stops. However, as the data below shows, all of these stops did little to impact the crime rates it sought to reduce. One of the key reasons used for stop-and-frisk is that it can take guns off the streets of New York City, a point that Mayor Bloomberg has often repeated is key to reducing crime. However, only 2% of all stops produced any guns and, as the data on the right shows, even these stops did little to reduce the number of shootings and murders over the course of the Bloomberg administration. Law professor and former Department of Justice prosecutor Paul Butler explains that having a constant police presence simply encourages would-be criminals to leave their guns at home; additionally, these "heavy-handed" tactics only serve to further drive the community and law enforcement apart [4]. However, despite the lack of evidence of these policies, Mayor Bloomberg defended his administration in 2013, arguing that he believes "we disproportionately stop whites too much. And minorities too little", while also pointing out that such policies will benefit the Hispanic and Black communities the most. Ironically, Mayor Bloomberg originally justified the continuation and intensification of stop-and-frisk by claiming that it was intended to "reduce the animosity between civilians and police", a goal we will see it has failed to achieve [5].
Minorities and Law enforcement
As the data above shows, minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics, make up a large part of the prison population in the state of New York. Blacks and Hispanics make up only 34% of the total population in New York state but compose 75% of the prison population. The statistics are most telling when one looks at the Black population; Blacks are 16% of the total population but make up 53% of the prison population in New York [6]. Additionally, the chart on the right shows that stop-and-frisk continues to ignore whites in their stops, with around 10% of stops being white, despite the fact that whites make up 26% of the prison population. This difference in interactions with law enforcement is not unique to New York, however, as the data below shows that there has been an increasing distrust of police officers and law enforcement nationwide, particularly among the Hispanic and Black communities. The data shows a clear difference in the realities experienced between these groups; whites, which make up a large part of the police force, have a significantly greater confidence in law enforcement while Blacks, who are the most targeted demographic, have the most negative opinion of police, with this group even having more negative view of Hispanic-police relations than Hispanics themselves.
Additionally, Gallup has recently released polls that show that current levels of trust in police (52% overall) are now equal to trust levels in 1993, which was a period of very tense relations between Blacks and law enforcement, as a result of incidents like those with Rodney King. Recent victims, like Travyon Martin and Michael Brown to name a few, have similarly returned us to pre-2000 levels of distrust in law enforcement; police are approaching the Black community as the problem itself, rather than attempting to return to the more humanistic community policing approach. As the maps below show, police are not solely basing their stops on crime, the most prominent example being Staten Island. Despite the fact that Staten Island's crime is relatively low and concentrated in the center of island, law enforcement continues to target areas north of the Staten Island Expressway, which is the only section of Staten Island that contains majority-minority census tracts. Law enforcement also fails to patrol the northern end of Brooklyn, likely due in large part to the fact that area is undergoing gentrification.
The future for law enforcement
The trust between law enforcement and the communities they swore to serve is currently at its lowest levels in 22 years. Stop-and-frisk was put under severe restrictions by Judge Shira Shiendlin and Mayor Bill de Blasio has sworn to severely cut back on stops in New York City, which currently sit at around 22,000 in 2015, a relatively low figure compared to the 685,000 stops in 2011. Currently, crime in New York City is now at its lowest point since the 1960s, when records of New York City crime data began being taken, despite the all-time low number of stops in 2015. However, as cities like Los Angeles have shown us, stop-and-frisk is not the sole determinant of law enforcement's effectiveness, or sometimes ineffectiveness; the LAPD and NYPD are particularly infamous for their numerous accusations of police brutality. The friction between minority communities and the predominantly white police force that patrol their streets cannot be understated; years of aggressive policing towards these communities has led to them viewing law enforcement as something to be feared, not called on when their communities face serious threats.
Current predictions of the United States in 2050 estimate that 13% of the population will be Black (constant from 2005 levels) and another 29% will be Hispanic (up from 14% in 2005) [7] so the importance of maintaining strong relations with the minority community is only becoming more and more important. The erosion of trust in police did not occur overnight, it came as a result after years of abuse of the Black and Hispanic communities; similarly, solving the problem will not be an overnight solution. Recommendations for law enforcement policies are well beyond the scope of this research, but one thing is certain: it will be a long and arduous process to return to a point where police are once again seen as a positive force in minority communities.
Current predictions of the United States in 2050 estimate that 13% of the population will be Black (constant from 2005 levels) and another 29% will be Hispanic (up from 14% in 2005) [7] so the importance of maintaining strong relations with the minority community is only becoming more and more important. The erosion of trust in police did not occur overnight, it came as a result after years of abuse of the Black and Hispanic communities; similarly, solving the problem will not be an overnight solution. Recommendations for law enforcement policies are well beyond the scope of this research, but one thing is certain: it will be a long and arduous process to return to a point where police are once again seen as a positive force in minority communities.
Sources
1. Morganteen, Jeff. "What the CompStat Audit Reveals about the NYPD - The New York World." The New York World. The New York World, 03 July 2013. Web.
2. Levitt, Steven D. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not." Journal of Economic Perspectives 18.1 (2004): 163-90. Web.
3. Rosenfeld, Richard, Robert Fornango, and Eric Baumer. "Did Ceasefire, Compstat, And Exile Reduce Homicide?*." Criminology Public Policy Criminology Public Policy 4.3 (2005): 419-49. Web.
4. Donald, Heather Mac, Donnel Baird, Robert Gangi, Paul Butler, John Eterno, and Dennis Smith. "Does 'Stop and Frisk' Reduce Crime?" New York Times. New York Times, 17 July 2012. Web.
5. Capeheart, Jonathan. "‘Stop and Frisk,’ Bloomberg and Me." Washington Post. Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2013. Web.
6. "New York Profile." Prison Policy Initiative. Prison Policy Initiative, n.d. Web. <http://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/NY.html>.
7. Passel, Jeffrey S. "U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050." Pew Research Centers Hispanic Trends Project RSS. Pew Research Center, 11 Feb. 2008. Web. 20 May 2016
2. Levitt, Steven D. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not." Journal of Economic Perspectives 18.1 (2004): 163-90. Web.
3. Rosenfeld, Richard, Robert Fornango, and Eric Baumer. "Did Ceasefire, Compstat, And Exile Reduce Homicide?*." Criminology Public Policy Criminology Public Policy 4.3 (2005): 419-49. Web.
4. Donald, Heather Mac, Donnel Baird, Robert Gangi, Paul Butler, John Eterno, and Dennis Smith. "Does 'Stop and Frisk' Reduce Crime?" New York Times. New York Times, 17 July 2012. Web.
5. Capeheart, Jonathan. "‘Stop and Frisk,’ Bloomberg and Me." Washington Post. Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2013. Web.
6. "New York Profile." Prison Policy Initiative. Prison Policy Initiative, n.d. Web. <http://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/NY.html>.
7. Passel, Jeffrey S. "U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050." Pew Research Centers Hispanic Trends Project RSS. Pew Research Center, 11 Feb. 2008. Web. 20 May 2016